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MEMORANDUM OF RESPONDENT HONORABLE
DEAN E. CONDER

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original petition for extraordinary writ
to vacate an order of the district court entered against the
press during a criminal trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming the
order of the district court which restricted the press from using
the term "Sugarhouse rapist" during the trial of Ronald Dale
Easthope.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September of 1981, Ronald Dale Easthope was
arrested and charged with aggravated sexual assault.
On the day of his trial, February 3, 1982, prior
to impaneling the jury, the Honorable Dean E. Conder held
a final hearing in camera on certain defense motions (R. at
165-174).

At that hearing Judge Conder ordered that the term

"Sugarhouse" not be used in the trial by either counsel or
witnesses, nor that the defendant's criminal record be
alluded to during the trial (R. at 167) .

Defense counsel

mentioned the "considerable amount" of pre-trial publicity
(R. at 165), and Judge Conder found that the epithet "Sugarhouse Rapist" was "commonly known" (R. at 167) .

Judge Conder

denied a defense motion to sequester the jury (R. at 165).
At the end of the victim's testimony, Judge Conder
held another in camera hearing (R. at 254-258) .

The defense

moved to have the press restricted, for the brief period of the
trial only, from using the epithet "Sugarhouse Rapist" (R. at
254-255) .

The motion was granted (R. at 254) .

Upon further

defense motion the court ordered the press not to refer to "Mr.
Easthope's activities prior to the trial that would in any way
show his involvement with the law."

(R. at 255).

The order was released immediately after a verdict
was returned and the jury polled (R. at 650) .
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The epithet "Sugarhouse Rapist" had been created
several years before, and used extensively by the press to
describe an unknown assailant believed to be responsible
for a series of apparently related rapes in the Sugarhouse
area of Salt Lake City.

Later, in 1971, Mr. Easthope was

arrested and convicted of two of the rapes attributed to
this "Sugarhouse Rapist."

Around the time of his trial on

the two rape charges, the news media referred to Mr. Easthope
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist."

From arrest, until the first day

of Mr. Easthope's current criminal trial for aggravated
sexual assault, the news media referred to Mr. Easthope
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist."

See exhibit A to brief

of KSL, and footnote 1 on page 4 of the brief of KUTV, for
examples.

The press also alluded to the numerous rapes

attributed to the "Sugarhouse Rapist" in the past, but which
were never proven to have been corrunitted by Mr. Easthope.
During the course of the trial Mr. Easthope testified
in his own defense (R. at 557-596).

While the jury was informed

of Mr. Easthope's two prior rape convictions, the jurors were
not informed that Mr. Easthope was the person branded by the
news media as the "Sugarhouse Rapist."

The jury was also not

informed of the unproven innuendos that Mr. Easthope had
perpetrated the other rapes attributed to this "Sugarhouse

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Rapist."

The news media was ready to use the prejudicial

brand during the current trial.

Petitioner KUTV's

memorandum at page 4.
Mr. Easthope was found guilty of aggravated
sexual assault and was sentenced to an indeterminate term
of five years to life in prison.
I

THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IS NOT ABSOLUTE:
A.

WHERE IT THREATENS A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL;

B.

WHERE IT PRESENTS A CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER OF INTERFERING
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE; AND

C.

WHERE THE ALLEGEDLY PROTECTED
SPEECH CONSISTS OF A MERE
INFLAMMATORY EPITHET.
A

Whenever two or more Constitutional rights come
in conflict, it is difficult, but necessary, to decide which
of the two rights must bow and which shall be dominant.
This Court has found thtat it is difficult to resolve the
tension which occurs when freedom of the press conflicts
with the right to a fair trial.

In re Modification of

canon 3A(7), 628 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1981).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The United States Supreme Court has held that freedom
of the press, under some circumstances, dominates over other
Constitutional rights.

For example, in Cox Broadcasting

Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)

(hereafter Cox), cited by

petitioner KUTV at page 10 and petitioner KSL at pages 14 and
15, the United States Supreme Court held that a rape victim's
right to privacy under the specific facts of that case was
not sufficient to allow criminal or civil sanctions to be
applied against a reporter who published a victim's name.
Cox is inapposite to the case at bar.

A decisive factor in

the court's conclusion therein was that the expectation of
a right to privacy is small when the information in dispute
is already public:
[T]he prevailing law of invasion of
privacy generally recognizes that the
interests in privacy fade when the
information involved already appears on the
public record.
Id. at 494-495.
In the present case, rights to a fair trial, rights
to liberty are concerned, not rights to privacy in matters
everyone knows anyway.

It is enlightening to note that the

court did not ever rule that rights to privacy may never, under
any circumstance, outweigh freedom of the press.
The leading case, dealing with a confrontation
between the First Amendment and a criminal defendant's right

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to a fair trial, is Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976)

(hereafter Nebraska Press).

The order appealed

from in Nebraska Press prohibited (1) reporting of events
occurring at an open preliminary hearing, and (2) all facts
"strongly implicative" of the accused.

The United States

Supreme Court held that the press can report what occurs at
a trial and that the second part of the order was too vague
and broad to survive scrutiny.

But, in Nebraska Press the

Court refused to hold freedom of the press superior to a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial:
ITJhe petitioners would have us
declare the right of an accused subordinate
to their right to publish in all circumstances.
But if the authors of these guarantees, fully
aware of the potential conflicts between them,
were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue
by assigning to one priority over the other,
it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution
by undertaking what they declined to do.
It
is unnecessary, after nearly two centuries,
to establish a priority applicable in all
circumstances. Yet it is nonetheless clear
that the barriers to prior restraint remain
high unless we are to abandon what the Court
has said. . . .
Id. at 561.
In Nebraska Press, the United States Supreme Court
specifically held that where lengthy pretrial periods are
concerned, there must be a factual, case by case analysis of
the propriety of using orders against the press to insure a

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant's right to a fair trial.

The Court then presented

a standard by which courts could decide the merits in
proposed, lengthy, pretrial orders against the press:
We turn now to the record in this
case to determine whether, as Learned
Hand put it, "the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger."
!Citations omitted.]
To do so, we must examine the evidence before
the trial judge when the order was entered to
determine (a) the nature and extent of pretrial
news coverage; (b) whether other measures would
be likely to mitigate the effects of
unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how
effectively a restraining order would operate
to prevent the threatened danger. The precise
terms of the restraining order are also
important.
Id. at 562.
The clear holding in Nebraska Press that the freedom
of the press is not absolute, and that a case by case analysis
is appropriate if a person's liberty is at stake has never
been overruled or modified.

Thus only an analysis of the

specific facts will determine, in this case, which constitutional right is paramount.

See Point II below for that

analysis.

-7-
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B

In Marshal v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959)
(hereafter Marshal)

the United States Supreme Court found that

news reports of suppressed evidence which were heard by jurors
were prejudicial.

As in the present case, the news accounts

in Marshal included the defendant's prior record and allegations of other, unrelated wrongdoing.

The Court held:

We have here the exposure of jurors
to information of a character which the trial
judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not
be directly offered as evidence. The
prejudice to the defendant is almost certain
to be as great when that evidence reaches the
jury through news accounts as when it is a part
of the prosecution's evidence Icitation omitted].
It may indeed be greater, for it is then not
tempered by protective procedures.
Id. at 312-13.
In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)

(here-

after Pennekamp) , Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion
stated:

"The right to undermine proceedings in court is not

a special prerogative of the press."

Id. at 364.

In

Pennekamp, the United States Supreme Court considered a
contempt citation issued against the press.

The court held

that such citations are correct and proper if the speech used
by the press presented a "clear and present danger" to the
administration of justice.

Id. at 334.

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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To allow court ordered restrictions, the press
commentary must concern pending litigation.

The purpose

of the "clear and present danger rule" as it applies to the
administration of justice was explained in Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941):
The very word "trial" connotes
decisions on the evidence and arguments
properly advanced in open court.
Legal
trials are not like elections to be
won through the use of the meeting-hall,
the radio, and the newspaper."
Id. at 271.
In the instant case, Judge Conder found that use of
the brand "Sugarhouse Rapist" would be "highly prejudicial"
during the brief trial period (R. at 254) .

He so feared the

prejudicial impact thereof that he ordered counsel and
witnesses not to use even the word "Sugarhouse" alone (R. at 167) .
The fears and prejudice engendered by use of
"Sugarhouse Rapist" do not stem from the charge at trial but
from earlier, unrelated events.

Use of the "Sugarhouse Rapist"

injects new improper material into the present case which
does not concern the present case at all.

If a juror heard

that Mr. Easthope was alleged to be this infamous "Sugarhouse
rapist" of the past, that alone could inflame and prejudice
the juror.

-9-
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Before Mr. Easthope was first charged with any of
the rapes attributed to the "Sugarhouse Rapist," the epithet's
use was part of a very emotional situation.

An atmosphere of

extreme fear existed in the sugarhouse area.
During his recent trial, a clear and present
danger existed that the news media's resurrection of the
epithet, and its use in connection with Mr. Easthope would
arouse and inflame hatred, and would prevent the court from
administering justice to Mr. Easthope, who was charged with
a separate, very serious crime.

Judge Conder did not order

the press never again to use the appellation.

The court

order only imposed six days of restriction during which Mr.
Easthope could receive justice.

After the verdict was

announced the press could sensationalize again all they
wanted.
Because the use of "Sugarhouse Rapist" would have
presented a

clear, palpable danger of prejudicing the jury,

Judge Conder was correct in ordering the press not to use
the epithet until after verdict was reached.

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

c
In addition to the need to analyse facts and
circumstances where two constitutional rights conflict; many
forms of speech and expression have no constitutional protection.
Examples are words creating a clear and present danger of
thwarting the administration of justice, libel and slander,
obscenity, fighting words, speech harming the national security,
etc ..

The United States Supreme Court has often tried to
distinguish real, protectable expression, that is, the exposition
of ideas and thoughts, from words or expressions which do not
rise to the level of cormnunication of

information~

For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568

(1942) the U.S. Supreme Court faced the question whether

"fighting words" were protected speech.

The court held they

were not:
It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
Id. at 572.
This rule; concerning "fighting words", was best stated
in Cantwell v. Connecticut,310
the court

U~S.

296, 309-310 (1940) where

declared~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization-11provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not
in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.~ . •
Id. at 309-310 (Emphasis added)
An

epithet is defined in Webster's New Collegiate

Dictionary as "a characterizing word or phrase accompanying or
occurring in place of the name of a person or thing; or a
disparaging or abusive word or phrase."
The appellation

11

Sugarhouse Rapist'' falls clearly within the

definition of an epithet.
in£orrnation about

(Emphasis added).

Mr~

"Sugarhouse Rapist" does not convey

Easthope~

It brands Mr. Easthope by

innuenCbas that person responsible for numerous rapes he was never
convicted of.

The stigma attached to the epithet, if it reached

the jury, would be highly inflammatory and prejudicial.
The order of Judge Conder strove to prevent something
far worse than a breach of the peace through "fighting words".
Judge Conder's order was tailored to avoid the mere use of an
epithet that could violate

Mr~

Easthope's Constitutional right to

a fair trial and result in the loss of his freedom for from five
years to the rest of his life.

The news media was free to attend

and repo!:'t all the proceedings and convey all "information" during
Mr. Easthope's trial for aggravated

sexual assault.

The

challenged order's only purpose was to keep sensationalistic
journalism from branding Mr. Easthope with an epithet which could
deny to Mr. Easthope a fair, objective trial.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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II
THE ORDER OF THE COURT IN QUESTION WAS
REASONABLE, NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND M..7\NDATED BY THE NEED FOR A FAIR
TRIAL.
Balancing the precise terms of the district court's
order between the First and Sixth Amendments results in
affirmance of the lower court's decision.
The terms of the order were minimally restrictive.
The press could attend the trial.
being present*

The press was not barred from

The press could report on any facts or information

developed at the trial.

They were only ordered not to brand the

defendant as the "sugarhouse rapist"; a term which the court
found was "highly prejudicial"o

(R.. at 254)

The duration of the order was minimal.

The order went

into effect on the first day of trial and was released as soon
as the jury verdict was rendered and the jury polled.

(R. at 650)

The court had not restricted the press in any manner in its pretrial publicity.

In fact, the press had used the term "sugarhouse

ra_pist" in referring to Mr. Easthope often before trial.

(R.

at

165; pet. KUTV Memo at 4 n. l; Pet. KSL Memo. Exh. A)

The court had every indication that the press would
brand Mr. Easthope as the "sugarhouse rapist" during the trial.
The press had done so during pre-trial stages of the case.
pre-trial publicity had been described as "considerable".

The
(R. at 165)

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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P~titioners

had refused to follow their own voluntary principles

and guidelines concerning pre-trial publicity, which guidelines
state that prior record and prior charges should not be publicized
pre-trial.

See below at 15-16.
The epithet "sugarhouse rapist" is not a part of the

exposition of ideas, nor information entitled to constitutional
protection.
epithet.

The term is a characterization, a slur, a brand, an

It is a fictitious nomenclature for an unknown person

who may or may not have committed all of the rapes attributed
tc him.

It is a term for sensationalizing news accounts and

increasing publicity.
The epithet "sugarhouse rapist

11

was highly inflammatory.

The judge found the term "highly prejudicial," and indeed it was.
The further order of the court not to publicize the prior contacts
with the law was only an afterthought to ensure that not only the
letter but also that the spirit of the first order would not be
violated.
A real and substantial liberty interest was at stake.
Mr. Easthope was an ex-convict who would almost assuredly go to
prison for at least five years and perhaps for life, if convicted.
In balancing all of the factors, we have on one hand an
order of brief duration, which did not limit attendance or reporting
of the trial, which did not limit pre-trial publicity, which limited
only the branding or characterizing of the defendant about matters

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of a highly inflammatory nature
of this trial by several years

which preceded the subject matter
and which related to unproven

charges the press desired to attribute to Mr. Easthope.
On the other hand, we have only the press' desire for sensationalism,
for prejudicial publicity, for slurring.
In May, 1980, a special committee was empanelled by the
Utah State Bar which promulgated Standards and Guidelines for
news reporting of criminal and other

proceedings~

The Guidelines

were "published and distributed" as "Principles and Guidelines
for news reporting" by six organizations including KUTV News,
KSL TV News, Deseret News and the Utah State Bar.

Committee

members included Michael Beardsley, an agent OID Petitioner KUTV
Inc.; Ernest Ford, an agent of petitioner KSL;and William Smart,
an agent of Petitioner Deseret News.

Admittedly the Standards

and <9uidelines are "voluntary", and "do not necessarily reflect
in all respects what the members of the

·~··

news media believe

would be permitted or required by law".
Id. at 1.

Therefore, respondent cannot argue that petitioners

are estopped from asserting some right to publicize the material
in question.

However, the Guidelines do state:

These Gtiidelines are intended to reflect
standards that are a re·as·ona.b1e. means of
accommodating, on a voluntary basisF the
correlative constitutional rights of free
speech and free press with the right of an
accused to a fair trial.
Id. at 1.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Under "prior convictions" the guidelines read:
Prior criminal charges and convictions
are, in some areas, matter of public record
and in some instances may be available to the
news media through police agencies or from
court records.
Such information is inadmissible
on the question of guilt and pretrial publication
may jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial
and therefore, should be avoided.
Id. at 4.
Although the guidelines are not legally binding, being
voluntary, they are factually significant in that they show to
the court that petitioners and the press recognize that even pre·
trial publicity can affect the outcome of judicial proceedings,
let alone publicity during the trial itself.

They also reflect

to a judc;e, that if the news media voluntarily feels it should
avoid the less dangerous pre-trial publicizing of prior charges
and convictions, then the publicizing thereof should be avoided
even more during the so critical trial period.

The fact that the

press had refused to follow its own guidelines concerning Mr.
Easthope indicates to a judge that they will likely not refrain
from use of "Sugarhouse Rapist" during trial.
Pre-trial press publicity is less likely to prejudice
than trial publicity.

Jury voir dire can weed out people who

have been exposed to too much pre-trial publicity, or who have
been influenced thereby.

However, a juror who hears prejudicial

material during trial cannot be weeded out.

Thus, a weighing

and balancing of constitutional rights concerning trial publicity
should not require as strict a scrutiny as a consideration
concerning pre-trial publicity.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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But even if we use the pre-trial publicity test in
Nebraska Press, supra, the order of Judge Conder was appropriate.
We have already .analyzed ''the precise terms of the
restraining order" and the "nature and extent of pre-trial news
coverage".

There remains the question of how effectively the

order would prevent the threatened danger.

The only likely way

the jurors could be infected with petitioners' desired,
inflarmnatory characterization, would be through the media itself.
The order would undoubtedly be effective, and indeed was
effective in stopping the threat of prejudice.
The last prong

in the Nebraska Press pre-trial publicity

test is to weigh all less restrictive measures.
One could argue that ordering the jurors not to read
or listen to news accounts concerning the trial would be sufficient.
The judge did make such orders, but felt they were insufficient;
otherwise, he would not have entered his order .to the
press.
The current state of the art of news reporting is such
that people cannot be assured that news will only be presented
at certain known times of the day.

Almost daily,newsbreaks on

radio and television suddenly occur, with extremely brief news
updates of local and national
r.

significance~

Jurors could not be

assured of avoiding news accounts of the trial even if they quickly
turned off a television set when a newsbreak appeared; or refrained
from watching all of the regularly scheduled news.

The headlining

is too quick and succinct.
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In addition, if the general public were aware of the
press' brand of Mr. Easthope during the trial,

jurors might well

be informed of the characterization of Mr. Easthope in casual
conversation.

A juror could easily be asked about his /her jury

duty, or volunteer that the juror is participating in a rape trial,
at which time a party to the conversation might question whether
it was the trial of the "sugarhouse rapist, 11 which that person
knows, from the news media; is occurring.
Although-not in the record, a recent capital homicide
case is illustrative of the very distinct possibility of the above
inadvertent discovery of inf larmnatory press insinuation and
innuendo.

In the trial of Ervil Lebaron, a conscientious juror,

under the same type of order as in the present case

not to read

or listen to news accounts of the trial, was accidentally tainted
with knowledge of prior, unproven innuendos perpetrated by the press
A young grandson or other young relative of the juror, knowing
that the juror was involved in the LeBaron trial, after hearing a
news report, ran in to tell the juror that LeBaron had killed seven
other people in the past.

As a result thereof, Judge Banks could no·

proceed with the penalty phase of the trial and sentenced LeBaron
to life imprisonment.
A change of venue would have been useless.

Petitioners

KUTV, KSL, and Deseret News have a state-wide circulation.

Without

leaving the state of Utah, it would be impossible to escape the
effects of their use of the epithet "sugarhouse rapist 11

••
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Merely to continue the trial would also have been
an exercise in futility.

Whenever the trial did occur, it

would still be newsworthy, and the press would be ready to
act.

The interest of the press

in their journalistic creation

"sugarhouse rapist" had lasted ten years, clearly showing that
no reasonable continuance would avoid prejudicial publicity.
A final alternative would have been to sequester
the jury.
tion.

It is true that many courts have favored sequestra-

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).

In more

recent cases, the alternative of sequestration has been
shown to suffer numerous flaws.

In Sacramento Bee v. U.S.

District Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981), the court
found that preparing to sequester the jury involved
mechanical complications that would hamper the trial
and:
would mean in effect, putting
the jury in prison, in effect putting
them in a posture in which there will
be deep resentment against the court,
and perhaps the defendant in this
matter, having results which will be
unpredictable, but clearly serious.
Id. at 480.
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Beyond the influence on the jury and the mechanical
complications, sequestration is a heavy burden to be imposed
financially upon the county.
381 (N.J. 1977).

State v. Allen,373 A.2d 377,

Court administrators have found that a twelve

person jury costs the state at least $1,500 to $1,800 per diem
to sequester.

Commonweal th v. Hayes, 414 A. 2d 318, 348 (PA.·1980).

The expense and prejudice caused by sequestration are
heavy.

These must not be balanced against the news media's

right to publish the facts of the trial, which was never in
question.

The press would have the state and Mr. Easthope

shoulder these burdens so the news media may use an epithet,
"made for publicity", that would be adverse to the defendants'
right to a fair trial (R.at 255).
One could argue that the court could have allowed the
news media a completely free hand in its characterizations and
slurs, and if the jury did become prejudiced, a new trial could
be granted.

This alternative is unreasonable for two reasons.

First, a tainted juror could be timid and not reveal
the taint.
Second, the alternative of a re-trial is not really a
very viable

alternative.

The United States Supreme Court

has said:
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The costs of failure to afford a fair
trial are high~
In the most extreme cases,
like Sheppard and Estes, the risk of injustice was avoided when the convictions
were reversed.
But a reversal means that
justice has been delayed for both the
defendant and the State; in some cases,
because of lapse of time re-trial is
impossible or further prosecution is
gravely handicapped~
Moreover, in borderline cases in which the conviction is not
reversed, there is some possibility of
an injustice unredressed.
Nebraska Press at 555.
In balancing First and Sixth Amendment rights under
the present circumstances, the order of Judge Conder was reasonable,
fair and appropriate.

Even if the Nebraska Press test for pre-

trial publicity is used, the result is the same.
CONCLUSION
The freedom of the press is not absolute.

Where it

comes in conflict with other constitutional rights, courts must
balance and weigh the interests of each such right.

In balancing,

the interest of the.press in characterizing and branding the
criminal defendant in the trial below

is far outweighed by

the brief, narrow order of the court issued to protect the right
to a fair trial.

The use of the term "sugarhouse rapist" was a

mere epithet, and was not a part of the "exposition of ideas"
protected by the First Amendment.

The use of the term presented
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a clear and present danger of interfering with the
administration of justice.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

BY: ~~~~~~~~~====~~~
ROBERT R. WALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
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